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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I imagine that those hearty souls who have survived this April Fool’s 
Day prosecution of the Supreme Court’s “Supreme Mistakes” have now 
come to grips with the fact that this panel is not a joke—we really have 
scheduled a civil procedure case for the last panel of the day!  Of course, 
Professor Sherry has made it worth sticking around.  In her eloquent and 
interesting article, she has demonstrated why the Court’s decision in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 deserves its day in the Malibu sun—with the idea 
being, to quote Justice Brandeis (the author of the Erie decision itself), that 
“[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”2  Before we disinfect, 
however, we must come to some conclusion as to what the infection is that 
ails us.  As this is a civil procedure panel, my approach as the appointed 
defense counsel is to plead confession and avoidance.  In so doing, I will 
admit the facts alleged in Professor Sherry’s declaration, but I will seek to 
show why the Erie opinion and Justice Brandeis should be discharged from 
liability. 
 
     *  Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.  This article is a response 
to Suzanna Sherry’s Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time and 
part of Pepperdine Law Review’s April 1, 2011 Supreme Mistakes symposium, exploring the most 
maligned decisions in Supreme Court history.  Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: 
Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 (2011).  Thanks are due to Professor 
Edward J. Larson and the editors of the Pepperdine Law Review, in particular Blake McKay 
Edwards and Janelle M. White, for inviting me to offer a response.  The helpful research assistance 
of Julia MacDonald is gratefully acknowledged. 
 1.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 2.  LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (2d ed. 
1914). 
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My confession and avoidance proceeds in three steps.  First, I want to 
take stock of what can reasonably be said about the Erie decision.  Second, I 
want to grapple with Erie’s lasting effects.  Third, I will investigate whether 
Erie can be redeemed. 
II.  CONFESSION: ERIE AS INKBLOT 
As Professor Sherry explains in her article, Justice Brandeis rested the 
Erie decision on three contestable grounds.3  First, that as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, the phrase the “laws of the several states” in the 
Rules of Decision Act4 plainly covered state common law as well as 
statutory law.5  Second, that uniformity of law had been thwarted and “grave 
discrimination by non-citizens against citizens”6 had been introduced by the 
Court’s decision in Swift v. Tyson.7  As the Court explained, “[p]ersistence 
of state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented 
uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of 
demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law 
developed a new well of uncertainties.”8  In addition, the ability to forum 
shop by virtue of the Swift rule inappropriately gave nonresident plaintiffs an 
advantage over resident defendants.9  The discriminatory advantage was that 
a nonresident plaintiff suing a resident defendant could forum shop between 
state court and federal court in hopes of finding the substantive law, as did 
Tompkins in the Erie decision itself, most favorable to his case.10  While a 
resident plaintiff suing a nonresident defendant could similarly forum shop, 
if the resident plaintiff brought suit in state court in hopes of gaining more 
favorable substantive law, then the nonresident defendant could remove the 
suit to federal court under the federal removal statute.11  This advantage 
meant that resident defendants sued by nonresident plaintiffs might be 
forced into not only a forum but unfavorable substantive law.   
The third and final ground relied upon by the Court was one of 
constitutional dimension: “Except in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the 
 
 3.  Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All 
Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 (2011). 
 4.  Rules of Decision Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1652 (2006)). 
 5.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV 49, 51–52, 81–88, 108 (1923)). 
 6.  Id. at 74 (referencing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)). 
 7.  41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
 8.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. 
 9.  Id. at 74–75. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) (permitting a nonresident defendant to remove a case filed in state 
court to federal court but not a resident defendant sued by a nonresident plaintiff). 
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law of the State . . . whether . . . declared by its Legislature in a statute or by 
its highest court in a decision . . . .”12  This was so because “no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer” the power to create substantive rules of 
common law “upon the federal courts.”13  Put another way, because 
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable to the states, the federal courts similarly have no power.14 
By way of confession, I think it is clear that none of these arguments in 
whole or in part provides a satisfactory justification for what the Court did in 
Erie.  Justice Brandeis’s law office history is far from compelling, and the 
defects identified, and constitutional arguments made, read more like an ex 
post rationalization than an application of well-settled principles of law.  As 
recognized by Justices Butler and McReynolds in dissent, members of the 
Court, including Justices Field and Holmes (whom Justice Brandeis quoted 
extensively in the main opinion), had come to the conclusion that the Swift 
decision should not be disturbed but should be limited in its application to 
new fields.15  In sum, the Erie decision seemed neither justified nor needed 
to members of the Court at that historical moment. 
But don’t take Professor Sherry’s and my word for it.  The Supreme 
Court itself in subsequent decisions developing the Erie doctrine has favored 
reconceptualizing the case over applying any of these precise grounds.  The 
decisions of the Court following Erie “did more than simply explicate the 
developing Erie doctrine; rather, each of them redefined the scope and thrust 
of Erie in such a manner as to yield an entirely new conceptualization of 
it.”16  In other words, we accept Erie as controlling law but have very little 
agreement about why it is controlling law and upon which grounds the 
doctrine firmly rests.   
What can we make, then, of Erie’s place as a supreme mistake in light 
of this?  In my view, and to put it somewhat grandly, Erie is a Rorschach 
test.17  The real importance of the Erie decision is that it provides each 
generation of lawyers and law professors the opportunity to perceive anew 
 
 12.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 80–90. 
 16.  19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4504, at 26 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
 17.  Created by Swiss psychiatrist, Hermann Rorschach, the Rorschach test is “a psychological 
test of personality and intelligence consisting of 10 standard black or colored inkblot designs that the 
subject describes in terms of what they look like to him.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1974 (2002). 
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Justice Brandeis’s inkblots and to construct their own vision of the role of 
federal courts, federal and state law, and federalism in our democracy.    
So, for instance, Justice Brandeis saw in the decision the progressive’s 
hope of constraining federal expansion and protecting state prerogatives, 
especially in the context of corporate regulation.18  Justice Frankfurter saw in 
it a way to short circuit the deleterious outcome of federal and state courts 
reaching different conclusions on questions of state law when exercising 
diversity jurisdiction, while at the same time preventing Justice Brandeis’s 
constitutional language from undermining much of the New Deal.19  As he 
stated in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,  
[T]he intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases 
where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of . . . 
diversity . . . , the outcome of the litigation in the federal court 
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the 
outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.20   
Notice in Justice Frankfurter’s language the statement of an “intent” behind 
Erie rather than a precise focus on Erie’s ratio decidendi, which would have 
required him to grapple with significant constitutional problems created by 
New Deal legislation.21 
Chief Justice Warren in Hanna v. Plumer believed that the “decision 
was also in part a reaction to the practice of ‘forum-shopping.’”22  As such, 
he conceptualized Erie as comprising “twin aims . . . : discouragement of 
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”23  
The language of avoiding “inequitable administration of the laws” fits 
perfectly with perceptions about the Warren Court as concerned with equal 
justice under law.24 
In light of these reformulations, it is fair to observe that Erie is no longer 
a case; it is a policy doctrine and that doctrine is “completely foreign to the 
decision that is its putative source.”25  If this is correct, Justice Brandeis has 
 
 18.  See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, 
Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21 (Kevin M. 
Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
 19.  Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 483, 489–91 (1997). 
 20.  Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (emphasis added). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). 
 23.  Id. at 468. 
 24.  Suzanna Sherry, All The Supreme Court Really Needs To Know It Learned from the Warren 
Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459, 459 (1997). 
 25.  Marian O. Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent: II, 40 TEX. L. REV. 619, 
625 (1962). 
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unindicted coconspirators.26  If Erie is guilty of being a supreme mistake, 
then, it is not simply because the decision itself was infirm but rather 
because what it has become is questionable, mistaken, or both in light of the 
doctrine’s development since the Erie decision. 
III.  AVOIDANCE: ERIE’S EFFECTS 
What has Erie become and is the doctrine mistaken?  In pleading 
confession and avoidance, I note that there is a significant chasm between 
the jurisprudence of Erie and Erie’s application in actual cases.  While the 
academy has struggled to find some rationality in the decision, the practicing 
bar is seldom confounded as most applications of the Erie doctrine in actual 
cases are clear.  Problems do persist, however. 
To begin with, there are problems associated with the so-called “Erie 
guess”—what is a federal court to do when state law is unsettled?  While 
certification27 is an obvious answer, the minimal use of that device perhaps 
illustrates that federal courts endeavor to faithfully apply state law as if they 
were state courts.  Looking at Erie positivistically, this is problematic 
because in such cases federal courts are exercising state common law 
authority.28 
Problems also remain regarding whether the enforceability of a forum-
selection clause is substantive or procedural for Erie purposes.  And 
questions remain concerning whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
is substantive or procedural.  Even in these cases, however, this is largely a 
distinction without a difference because most state forum-selection and 
forum non conveniens law follows federal law.29  Generally speaking, 
therefore, to the extent the Erie doctrine is muddied, the waters of practice 
are relatively clear. 
 
 26.  An “unindicted coconspirator” is “[a] person who has been identified by law enforcement as 
a member of a conspiracy, but who has not been named in the fellow coconspirator’s indictment.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 292 (9th ed. 2009). 
 27.  Certification is “[a] procedure by which a federal appellate court asks the U.S. Supreme 
Court or the highest state court to review a question of law arising in a case pending before the 
appellate court on which it needs guidance.”  Id. at 257. 
 28.  See David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 317, 327 (1977) (noting that the increased use of certification could decrease federal court 
influence “and may in fact mark the return to state courts of autonomy in deciding substantive state 
law questions”). 
 29.  See Ryan T. Holt, A Uniform System for the Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in 
Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1913, 1928–29, 1929 n.94 (2009) (stating that several circuits 
have come to the conclusion that applying federal or applicable state forum-selection clause law 
would lead to the same conclusion). 
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As Professor Sherry notes, however, this doctrinal clarity breaks down 
in the context of multistate suits.30  In suits that potentially call for the 
application of different state laws, such as cases crossing state borders, 
multistate class actions, or transnational cases, the Court has favored a rigid 
approach to the question—basically applying the conflict of laws rules of the 
state in which the court sits as opposed to a more nuanced approach.31  The 
result has been horizontal forum-shopping between the several states and 
forum-shopping into the United States in transnational cases.32 
Finally, what of federal common law, or more precisely, the statement 
in Erie that “[t]here is no federal general common law”?33  From 
constitutional interpretation to federal statutory construction to admiralty, 
federal common law remains a vibrant area of law that even Justice 
Holmes’s positivistic tendencies, as adapted by Justice Brandeis, cannot 
stamp out. 
In light of the above, how can it be argued that Erie is one of the worst 
Supreme Court decisions of all time?  The answer lies in what we see Erie to 
be. 
According to Professor Sherry, Erie is “pernicious”34 because it 
“plac[es] a murky constitutional imprimatur on judicial restraint [and] 
threatens to deprive us of one of our oldest and most effective tools for 
avoiding majority tyranny,”35 namely the judiciary’s “ability to lead.”36  The 
problem with the Erie decision is that it has closed the judicial imagination 
to the reasonable development of law and has politicized the judiciary by 
making every choice of law a choice of either democratic positive law or 
undemocratic judicial fiat. 
By way of confession, again, I think Professor Sherry’s observations 
deserve careful consideration.  Erie may have been wrongly decided but 
what makes it a “supreme mistake,” assuming arguendo that it is one, is that 
it has had effects that have rippled throughout many areas of the law and, 
indeed, jurisprudence.  If this is right, can Erie be redeemed? 
 
 30.  See Sherry, supra note 3. 
 31.  See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 32.  Genevieve G. York-Erwin, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1802–03 (2009) (“Federal courts increasingly refused to certify nationwide 
damage classes . . . on choice-of-law grounds. . . . [P]laintiffs’ attorneys responded to these 
developments by filing more nationwide classes in state courts and forum shopping for the most 
liberal certification practices and plaintiff friendly substantive laws.”). 
 33.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 34.  Sherry, supra note 3, at 149. 
 35.  Id. at 153. 
 36.  Id. at 152. 
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IV.  REDEEMING ERIE 
I think the answer to this question is “yes.”  In my view, a redeemed 
Erie doctrine would recognize first and foremost that the doctrine is about 
effectuating a policy of federalism.  To affect that policy, we need to think 
more—as Professor Sherry has encouraged us—about the appropriate 
allocation between federal courts and state courts, and federal law and state 
law, in our federal system.  Reflexive application of the mantras “apply state 
law,” “apply the conflict of laws rules of the state in which you sit,” and 
“there is no federal common law” may sound good, but they do little to 
advance a serious attempt at understanding complex decisions of law and 
judicial decision making generally. 
Recognizing this, I think that Justice Ginsburg’s recent dissent, joined 
by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.37 deserves close attention.  As Justice 
Ginsburg explained, the Court’s Erie decisions “instruct over and over again 
that, in the adjudication of diversity cases, state interests—whether advanced 
in a statute . . . or a procedural rule . . . —warrant our respectful 
consideration.”38  Note, Justice Ginsburg does not say the Erie decisions 
“warrant our deference” or even our “our application.”  Consideration 
implies judgment, and we need to more forthrightly engage that question of 
the considered judgment of the federal courts in the context of federalism in 
the years to come. 
Erie, then, can be redeemed not because of what it said or what it has 
been interpreted to say in the last nearly seventy-three years, but rather 
because of the intuition it has bestowed upon us.  In its best light, Erie 
requires us to take a step back and be sensitive to the federal and state issues 
at play in many cases and especially multistate cases that come before the 
federal courts.  To do otherwise risks annihilating “our federalism.”39 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Let me end, then, on a hopeful note.  What is needed is a new generation 
of Erie scholarship not focused on Justice Brandeis’s Erie or Erie’s “myth,” 
but rather on the tough problems created in multistate cases.  As Brainerd 
Currie observed twenty years after Erie was decided, “In the history of 
Anglo-American law the domestic case has been normal, the conflict-of-
 
 37.  130 S. Ct. 1431, 1460 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 38.  Id. at 1464. 
 39.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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laws case marginal.”40  Seventy years after Erie, that is no longer the case in 
our national and transnational world.  The answer may be, as I take 
Professor Sherry to argue, that the judicial imagination should be reopened 
in such cases.  Or the answer may be that, having been alerted to the issue 
through Erie, Congress should act.  Taking a position on that important 
debate should be the subject of another symposium. 
In any event, it would be a supreme mistake to go on believing that Erie 
gives us an answer; instead it alerts us only to the question. 
 
 
 40.  Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 227, 231 (1958). 
